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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MRS. SPRINGER'S ASSERTION THAT MR. SPRINGER 
HAS NOT ADEQUATELY MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE 
IS NOT WELL TAKEN. 
Mrs. Springer's principle contention on appeal appears to be 
that Mr. Springer, "did not marshal the evidence supporting the 
[decree] . . . and instead argued selected evidence favorable to 
[his] position." Ong International v. 11th Ave. Corp. . 210 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 9, 13 (April 6, 1993). As noted in his initial brief, 
Mr. Springer recognizes his responsibility to marshall the evidence 
in support of the trial court's findings, and then show that, 
despite that evidence, the court abused its discretion. Brief of 
Appellant at 6 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 52 and Cornish Town v. 
Roller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988)). A review of the points 
challenged on appeal, coupled with citations from Mr. Springer's 
initial brief, indicates that he has complied with this requirement 
and is entitled to the relief sought. 
Mr. Springer has chosen to challenge only the alimony and 
attorney fee awards on appeal.1 As previously set forth, an award 
of permanent alimony must be based upon "adequate findings and 
conclusions demonstrating that [the trial court] has considered 
three factors: (i) the financial condition and needs of the party 
seeking alimony, (ii) that party's ability to produce a sufficient 
income, and (iii) the ability of the party to provide support." 
Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1988) (citations 
omitted).2 Therefore, the trial court findings in each of these 
three areas must be supported by adequate evidence, or the trial 
court's award will be reversed. 
Mr. Springer has demonstrated that the court based its alimony 
decision on clearly erroneous findings regarding at least two of 
these three factors. In response, Mrs. Springer contends that Mr. 
Springer bears the burden of reviewing all of the evidence 
presented in the case and then indicating in general why the court 
xMrs. Springer attaches tremendous significance to Mr. 
Springer's decision not to pursue an appellate claim for reduction 
of child support. Mr. Springer specifically chose not to pursue 
that claim because he felt a moral obligation to support his 
children, and has in fact provided support in excess of the legally 
required levels even though the trial court's determination was 
incorrect. Mrs. Springer's contention that the child support 
decision is dispositive of the entire appeal is insupportable, 
particularly in light of her own Exhibit 26, in which she calculat-
ed child support at her gross pay level of $1846/month, rather than 
the $1777.91 she vigorously defends as correct. 
2Mrs. Springer chooses to rely upon Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072 (Utah 1985), a case cited in Noble. The standards listed under 
the two cases are identical, since Noble cites Jones as controlling 
authority. 
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Springer has indicated to the court the relevant evidence on the 
issue and shown why an abuse of discretion occurred. The purposes 
of the marshalling requirement have thus been fulfilled. 
A second area of income—the year end bonus—was not specifi-
cally addressed by the trial court, precluding meaningful review. 
Despite the lack of an adequate record, Mr. Springer's appeal 
proceeded on the reasonable assumption that the trial court felt 
the money was too speculative to consider. The only support for 
such a finding3 is Mrs. Springer's personal testimony, which Mr. 
Springer marshalled and showed to be wanting. Brief of Appellant 
at 11-12. 
Mrs. Springer also argues on appeal that the career ladder 
bonus monies were found to be speculative in general. She thus 
ignores and fails to address the trial court's misunderstandings 
regarding the various types of career ladder incentives. Instead, 
Mrs. Springer extrapolates the trial court's comments about Mrs. 
Springer's tumbling activities to the entire spectrum of "career 
money." She then attempts to argue general principles in support 
of the trial court's finding of her income. She indicates no 
specific piece of evidence which Mr. Springer failed to marshall 
Superintendent Jolley wrote a letter (introduced at trial as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 9) which indicated the bonuses would be lower 
in 1992 than in past years. Mr. Springer does not dispute that the 
amount might be less than before, but review of the letter shows it 
clearly implies that some money would be received: "it will be 
likely . . . that our averages will be lower this year than in 
previous years." The letter does not support a finding that no 
bonus would be received at all, and therefore is not marshalled to 
that end. See Brief of Appellant at | 11. 
4 
which would indicate the trial court considered the correct income 
information as required by Noble. Instead, she reargues her 
version of the facts and refuses to address the specific matter at 
hand. 
In short, Mr. Springer has marshalled the relevant evidence in 
support of the Judge's finding regarding Mrs. Springer's income, 
and has further shown how that evidence does not justify the 
court's award. The trial court abused its discretion, and the 
award should be overturned. The extensive, general commentary in 
Mrs. Springer's brief regarding a wide gamut of facts is not an 
adequate substitute for a specific, supportable finding on her 
income, and is therefore not material to the question at hand. 
B. The Trial Court's Findings Regarding Mr. Springer's 
Expenses Were Clearly An Abuse Of Discretion. 
Even a cursory review of the court's findings regarding Mr. 
Springer's expenses reveals reversible error. Of principle concern 
is the trial court's failure to include the $657.00 child support 
payment within the expenses Mr. Springer is required to pay each 
month. (R. 61.) Mr. Springer has marshalled no evidence in favor 
of this decision because no supporting evidence exists. See Brief 
of Appellant at 14-16. Mrs. Springer makes no attempt whatsoever 
in her 33 page brief to address this issue, a decision which was 
probably because she agrees that the trial court clearly abused its 
discretion. Proper consideration of the $657.00 indicates that Mr. 
Springer has no means to pay alimony, even using the court's own 
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figures. See Brief of Appellant at 16-18• The alimony should 
therefore be reversed on appeal because there is no evidence which 
supports the alimony award.4 
C. Alimony May Not Be Used To Equalize The Burden Of 
Supporting Minor Children. 
Mrs. Springer also fails to address the court7s error in using 
alimony to "tend to equalize the burden that the plaintiff has in 
maintaining the home for the three children . . . ." (R. 62), and 
apparently concedes that the trial court erred on this issue. 
POINT II 
MR. SPRINGER DID NOT CONSENT TO AN AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY FEES TO MRS. SPRINGER. 
Mrs. Springer responds to Mr. Springer's attorney fee 
arguments by first claiming that "Appellant failed to object to the 
award of any attorney fees at trial." (Mrs. Springer's brief p. 
30.) Not only is this claim false, it is irrelevant. The parties 
resolved many issues by stipulation prior to trial, but one of the 
issues they could not resolve, and which was reserved for trial, 
was the issue of attorney fees. (Tr. p. 9.) Mrs. Springer 
concurred by testifying that the parties has no disagreement on the 
marital debts except for the attorney fees. (Tr. p. 22.) Mr. 
Springer testified that his attorney fees were similar to those 
4In the alternative, the court's failure to make any specific 
finding of the exact amount of Mr. Springer's reasonable expenses 
precludes review and requires a remand for more detailed findings 
as required by Noble. 
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incurred by Mrs. Springer, thereby implicitly claiming that she was 
not entitled to any award of fees. (Tr. p. 82.) In light of this 
evidence, Mr. Springer fails to understand how Mrs. Springer can 
claim that he failed to object to the award of attorney fees. 
Although Mr. Springer chose to not dispute the reasonableness of 
the requested fees, it does not follow that he agreed to pay them. 
Even if Mr. Springer has failed to object to the attorney 
fees, the failure would not preclude his right of appeal. Mrs. 
Springer has cited to no case which holds that Mr. Springer had any 
obligation to object, where Mrs. Springer had the burden of proof 
on that issue. 
Mrs. Springer also claims that Mr. Springer failed to object 
at trial to the evidence that Mrs. Springer had a need for 
assistance in paying attorney fees and that Mr. Springer had the 
ability to assist. (Mrs. Springer/s brief p. 31.) This argument 
is likewise without merit. One of the primary focuses of the whole 
trial was the issue of whether Mrs. Springer needed assistance from 
Mr. Springer in meeting her obligations. Mr. Springer's objections 
on the issue could not have been more apparent even if he had worn 
a sign proclaiming his objection. Mrs. Springer's defense to this 
issue on appeal is frivolous. 
POINT III 
MRS. SPRINGER IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
Mrs. Springer was awarded one-half of her attorney fees at 
trial. Although citing to cases which hold that a party who is 
7 
awarded attorney fees at trial is generally also awarded fees on 
appeal, i.e., that the attorney fee award on appeal is the same as 
the award at trial, Mrs. Springer now claims that she should be 
awarded her full attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
This Court should reverse the existing attorney fee award, and 
should not award Mrs. Springer any fees for the appeal. If the 
Court nonetheless determines to authorize an award of attorney 
fees, the matter should be remanded for evidence on need and 
reasonableness. Mrs. Springer has not claimed that her need is the 
same as at trial, and the evidence will show that she in fact has 
no need for assistance. The trial court determined that the extent 
of Mrs. Springer's need was $2,064.00. Those fees have been paid, 
and Mr. Springer has complied with the decree to discharge sizeable 
additional obligations owed by Mrs. Springer. The evidence will 
show that Mrs. Springer has no further need of assistance, and any 
award of fees would be improper. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Springer has raised and supported several contestable 
issues on appeal, many of which Mrs. Springer fails to address. 
She makes no attempt to indicate why the trial court's failure to 
consider the child support payments as an expense was not a 
reversible abuse of discretion. She mentions no specific evidence 
not marshalled by Mr. Springer which would support the trial 
court's findings regarding income and expenses. Nowhere does she 
argue that the use of alimony to equalize the burden of child 
8 
support was not an abuse of discretion. Finally, she fails to 
address the clear inequity of allowing her a generous surplus above 
her reasonable needs while Mr. Springer's income does not meet even 
his needs as determined by the trial court. Her attorney fee 
contentions are similarly without merit. 
Mrs. Springer's attempt to avoid the specific inequities of 
the decree by copious citations to inconsequential facts is an 
argument "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." Mrs. 
Springer does quote more of the evidence than does Mr. Springer, 
but the additional evidence was not relevant to any of the issues 
raised on appeal. 
Mr. Springer respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
grant of permanent alimony, reverse the attorney fee award, and 
deny the request for fees on appeal. 
DATED this 4th day of January, 1993. 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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